

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI #5038-82

28 June 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Warning Working Group

FROM : [redacted]
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : Minutes

1. The Warning Working Group (WWG) met on 9 June 1982 at CIA Headquarters. In attendance were:



2. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the implementation of the DCI decisions on warning. The agenda for the meeting is provided in attachment A. In addition, State/INR and DIA submitted items for consideration; these are attachments B and C respectively.

3. [redacted] opened the meeting by relating the deliberations and concepts of the DCI in making his decisions on the Warning Working Group Report. He noted the DCI's particular concerns, e.g. the need for a full time NIO for Warning and passed out the DCI Talking Points on warning prepared for the previous NFIB meeting (attachment D).

4. The members of the WWG raised several questions:

a. What is the chain of command for the NIO/W? Does he have immediate access to the DCI? What is the NIO/W's

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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DOS review completed

DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted] ON 25 Jun 82
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SUBJECT: Minutes

DDI #5038-82
28 June 1982

relationship with the Chairman, NIC? Does the NIO/W position in the NIC represent a downgrading of his role in the bureaucracy?

Answer: The NIO/W is the DCI's personal staff officer on all warning matters and has immediate access to the DCI.

b. Will the NIO/W publish separate warning products?

Answer: In the NFIB deliberations of 19 January 1982, this was an option that was acceptable to the members. We envision that NIO/W products would be limited to special memoranda for the intelligence and Washington Community. As noted in the DCI Talking Points, the Community coordinated Alert Memorandum will continue to be used.


c. What is the mission of the National Warning Staff? What functions will it perform? What type of personnel are needed?

Answer: The mission of the NWS will be to assist the NIO/W and hence his responsibilities are representative of the staff functions. This mission statement will be incorporated into the revised DCID 1/5. NIO/W agreed to provide a draft revision for the next WWG meeting and all members were requested to review the present DCID 1/5 for potential changes.

5. The Warning Working Group concurred in the need for the NIO/W to become involved and take a Community leadership role in US support to and relationship with NATO warning elements. NIO/W noted the Group's concerns and agreed to work on the problem after the implementation efforts are on track.

6. agreed to set up a meeting of the NIO/W and C/NIC with the Military Intelligence Board to discuss the DCI's decisions.

7. The next WWG meeting will be scheduled as soon as a draft DCID 1/5 is ready for discussion.



Attachments:
a/s

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SUBJECT: Minutes

DDI #5038-82
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Distribution:

- 1 - each WWG member (LDX'd)
- 1 - NIO/W
- 1 - NIO/W Chrono✓
- 1 - DDI Registry
- 1 - WWG File

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI #4535/82

2 June 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Warning Working Group

FROM : [Redacted]
National Intelligence Officer for Warning


SUBJECT : DCI Decision on Warning

1. The DCI has signed a decision memorandum on the Warning Working Group report. I have attached a copy for your information.

2. The Director looks to the Working Group for the implementation actions, and I have scheduled a meeting for 1315 on Wednesday, 9 June in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. Some suggested topics for discussion are:

- a. Nominations for NIO/W
- b. Composition of the National Warning Staff
- c. Revision of DCID 1/5.

3. Pending our decisions on the selection of an NIO/W and the formation of a new staff, I will continue as NIO/W and the Strategic Warning Staff will function as an interim National Warning Staff.



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Attachment

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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June 8, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Robert A. Martin
INR/PMA

SUBJECT: June 9 Warning Working Group Meeting

The WVG June 9 meeting will provide a most useful opportunity to begin discussing the DCI's May 28 memorandum on the warning issue. My colleagues and I have spent a number of hours discussing the memorandum, but are not sure as yet that we fully understand it. Tomorrow's discussion, and subsequent ones, will provide an excellent opportunity for the WVG to develop a common appreciation and understanding of exactly where things stand.

Prior to arriving at such a shared appreciation--so that our future work commences with all at a common starting point--it may be somewhat premature to take up the topics noted in your June 2 memorandum. Therefore, I believe that a general discussion of the DCI memorandum would be our best beginning.

In addition, it might be useful to address several hypothetical warning situations to see how each might be handled under the warning system envisaged in the DCI memorandum. I would suggest the following exemplary situations:

- a Soviet worldwide air stand down;
- a US-USSR crisis confrontation (for example, a Soviet note reopening the Berlin crisis);
- a third area war (the best example is probably an approaching Arab-Israeli war); and

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--a future economic crisis (for example, an impending worldwide wheat shortage two years hence).

A discussion of the four items above should be helpful to our understanding of the appropriate responsibilities and organizational arrangements between and among the various actors, groups and organizations germane to warning.

To facilitate our discussion I am sending copies of this memo to our WWC colleagues.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ATTENTION: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR WARNING

SUBJECT: DCI Decision on Warning (U)

Reference: DDI #4535/82, 2 June 1982, subject as above.

1. (S) We have reviewed the DCI's paper to the NFIB on his decisions concerning warning. While there is agreement with the general thrust of the list of decisions, there is one basic decision that must be reached before any composition and/or location of the newly designated National Warning Staff (NWS) can be addressed. What must be determined are the mission and functions of the NWS. What role is it to play in support of the National Intelligence Officer for Warning (NIO/W) and what role is it to play in support of the national warning structure?
2. (U) Once these questions have been properly and completely addressed, then specific recommendations that were put forth in the DCI's paper can be equally addressed. But it is only when this basic structure has been articulated and agreed upon by all participants within the National Warning System that true progress can be achieved.
3. (U) DIA stands ready to offer continued assistance to your effort which is most important.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

[Signature]
 JAMES L. BROWN
 Major General, USAF
 Assistant Director
 for JCS Support

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DCI TALKING POINTS
ON WARNING

NFIB 8 June 1982

- I. Decision Memo on warning completes a series of efforts to improve our ability to produce warning intelligence.
- A. New initiatives in research support production of warning.
 - 1. Center for Terrorism Instability and Insurgency will identify causes and indicators of change.
 - 2. Intelligence Producers Council will coordinate Community research efforts on Third World and Soviet Bloc developments having warning implications.
 - B. NIO's will identify mid- to long-term warning situations through their estimates and monthly warning meetings.
 - C. Watch Committee will highlight short-term warning developments.
 - D. Alerting of fast breaking events will continue to be the function of our Ops Centers through the use of procedures such as CRITICS and NIOWONs.
- II. NIO for Warning and National Warning Staff will oversee and advise all the above. its in here as Special Assistant for Warning)
- A. Identify events and alternative outcomes not given adequate hearing in standard products.
 - B. Participate in and contribute to the production of estimates and Watch Committee reports.

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- C. Nominate, contribute, participate, conduct or coordinate specific research projects on warning matters.
 - D. Draw upon the results and products of individual agency and departmental warning activities, but not rely exclusively on their efforts. The whole should be greater than the sum of the parts.
- III. The Warning Working Group will be retained to assist the NIO/W. I look to them to carry out the implementation of this decision.
- IV. Warning function and Warning Staff will continue to be a Community effort.
- A. Warning function will be lodged in the National Intelligence Council.
 - B. NIO/W will be a full time position.
 - C. Composition, size and location of the staff will be worked out by Warning Working Group.
- V. The Warning mission will continue to be to insure "no surprise" to the President, NSC and Armed Forces. Obviously warning of an attack on the US or its allies is first priority; however, we must also address slowly-developing, longer-term threats to US security-- within the warning context.
- VI. The Alert Memorandum will be retained as a warning medium, but it is not the exclusive one since both estimates and the Watch Committee reports will have warning content. Other means of conveying the warning message will be employed when needed. Content, not form, is what is important.